Windhoek Treaty of 1992 changed the basis of economic co-operation to allow for 'efficiency, economy and competitiveness'. This shift led to the 1996 SADC Protocol on Trade Co-operation for the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA). At the time of writing (autumn 2000) , the implementation of the SADC FTA is almost complete. Successful regional associations usually require a strong political rationale for economic benefits to be realised.*(3) It remains to be seen whether or not the original unifying forces in Southern Africa are strong enough in the post apartheid era to enable SADC to build the institutions necessary for rule based economic integration and thus realise the potential economic benefits. In terms of economic conditions, the SADC countries are an extremely heterogeneous group. This can be seen from Table 1 , which includes those SADC member countries included in this study. At the time of the Windhoek Treaty, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ranges roughly 20:1 from richest to poorest. In terms of economic size, the range is nearly 100:1. GDP growth performance over the last 20 years varied considerably, but some SADC countries had a surprisingly good record of economic management in terms of the average rate of inflation, poverty reduction and human development. An important characteristic of the SADC region is the historically high level of barriers to trade. Whilst there was a considerable lowering of protection in the SADC region in the 1990s, there are still significant barriers to trade. This is shown in columns 2 and 3 of 1990s. Thus, there was an overall fall in the average tariffs from 15.1 to 9.3 per cent from the early 1990s to the tariff levels that prevailed roughly at the time of the 1996 SADC Protocol on Trade Co-operation. Although this decline in the average tariffs was relatively large, the height of the tariff protection that prevailed at the time of the Trade Protocol is still substantial, particularly in Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Thus, the basis exists for the first steps to be taken towards regional integration around the mutual reduction of trade barriers. Note: GDP is measured at factor cost. Estimates are from the World Bank Economic Indicators, 1998. These estimates of GDP differ slightly from earlier estimates used in the model database (see Evans (1998, Appendix 2) ).The latter were retained in the model for consistency reasons. All other data are from in Evans (1998, Appendix 2). Other aspects of economic structure are shown in Table 1 .
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As expected, the smaller countries have a larger GDP to trade ratio than the larger ones. The trade statistics show the SADC shares of imports and exports vary greatly from country to country. An overall picture of the trade flows within SADC can be seen from the last four columns of Table 1 showing the overall magnitude of the trade flows with intra SADC trade being mostly about 20 to 25 per cent of trade with the Rest of the World. Thus, the direction of trade, the height of tariffs, the sectoral structure of each economy, and the level of per capita GDP interact in a complex way in influencing the effects of the FTA. There have obviously been changes in the tariff structures since the 1996 Trade Protocol, and in the economic structures since the earlier part of the 1990s that affect the reported empirical findings in this paper. Nevertheless, the results reported lend themselves for a broad-brush interpretation of the major options for regional integration in the SADC region.
The Institutional Framework for Regional Integration*(4)
SADC has committed itself to an ambitious project of regional integration. The completion of this task will cost SADC members a lot in terms of effort, loss of sovereignty and economic adjustment. Equally, the costs of non-integration, that is the costs of not seizing this historical opportunity for greater regional integration, would potentially be high. They lie not only in foregoing all the gains from the agreed FTA, but also in a loss of credibility should the agreed FTA fail, sacrificing the opportunity to go further to a full Customs Union (CU) with a common
external tariff. The SADC Trade Protocol as it stands embodies a limited ambition, but it requires a rule-based system to succeed. Otherwise, producers, traders and consumers will not be willing to take the FTA seriously. If economic actors in the region are to plan their economic activities to take advantage of the opportunities for linkages across the region, they must know that the commitments are real and irreversible. The conditions for institutional reform that could deliver a workable FTA are demanding, and amount to a requirement that inter-state economic relations be governed by codes of law rather than political pressures. This process can be seen as a pooling, rather than as a loss, of sovereignty. If this argument were correct, a failure by SADC to realise the FTA would not just lose the potential benefits of the FTA itself; it would diminish the credibility of commitments made by the region's governments. SADC would also lose the potential benefits from moving on to establishing a CU. It may also lose the opportunity for regional co-operation whilst lowering trade barrier discrimination against non-members or Open Regionalism (OR), a process of trade barrier reduction carried out on the basis of Most Favoured Nation principles. The ultimate form of OR is, or course, Free Trade (FT) Each form of regional integration has a different level of mutual co-operation, from collaboration on infrastructure projects to establishing common laws and policies governing economic life. With the possible exception of OR, the alternative forms of regional integration will require an additional element of supra-nationality for SADC, in which member states can gain from the transition to a rule-based economic environment. In each case, estimated costs and benefits of integration have both impact effects and more dynamic consequences environment affecting the access of regional products into world markets, the terms of trade, and the growth of the world economy. It is an empirical matter whether or not regional trade associations are regionally or globally gainful, as noted by Winters (1996) Is there trade diversion under a CU that might grow out of the proposed FTA? (iv) What are the likely revenue effects of the regional integration options? (v) What are the likely dynamic consequences of the different forms of regional integration? (vi) What are the possible terms of trade consequences of the different forms of regional integration?
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
At the heart of the analysis of regional integration is the concept of trade creation and trade diversion. Terms of trade effects are also potentially important when regional integration affects the price of imports and exports to the rest of the world (ROW). Thus, regional integration through tariff variation has a total effect that is the sum of trade diversion and trade creation, less any loss of income through adverse terms of trade effects arising from the
over-all expansion of trade. In essence, trade creation occurs when an economic union leads to the growth of intra union trade that exploits comparative advantage i.e. when the union members experiencing expanded trade have relatively lower costs than do ROW suppliers. Trade diversion takes place when an economic union leads to an expansion in intra-union trade in which the relative costs are higher than those in competitor countries in the ROW. That is, where the expanded intra trade is against comparative advantage. It follows from the above that the static or impact effect of economic union is to improve members' welfare when trade creation outweighs trade diversion. This statement is qualified in three important ways. First, when global rather than regional welfare is taken into account, global welfare may also gain when there is regional trade creation. Similarly, when there is regional trade diversion, global welfare may also lose. Second, the regional trade association may have a positive or negative affect on its terms of trade. However, from a global perspective, this simply redistributes global welfare change. Third, the welfare benefits of a regional CU are dependent on the height of the common external tariff. A CU that is predominantly trade diverting, and therefore welfare worsening can, by appropriate choice of the common external tariff towards FT, be transformed into a gainful and predominantly trade creating CU.*(5) Finally, regional integration involves possible dynamic benefits, many of which are difficult to quantify. It is here that much of the controversy is generated about the conflict between potential medium run costs of trade diversion against
hoped for longer run dynamic benefits. The empirical results reported focus on the impact effects of the options combined with qualitative back-of-the-envelope estimates of some possible dynamic effects that are included in an ad hoc manner.
Regional Integration: An Overview
Three basic options are considered in the empirical part of this article. Elaborating a little on the definitions above, they are:
FTA. This applies when existing tariff structures applicable to non-member countries or the ROW are maintained as SADC moves towards FT between member countries. Typically, rules of origin have to be applied to a FTA to prevent importation through the country with the lowest tariff for a particular commodity.
CU. The central difference between a CU and a FTA is that the CU has a common external tariff, thus dispensing with the need for rules of origin. As already noted, the higher the common external tariff, the greater is trade diversion and the greater the chance that the CU will be welfare contracting. (c) OR. An extreme form of OR is Free Trade (FT), where each country in the regional association cuts member and non-member trade barriers to zero. In practice, OR envisages a bargaining process concentrating initially on co-ordinated MFN based trade policy reforms amongst the key member states. It is important to emphasise that the SADC FTA is critically dependent upon the successful operation of the 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p670 rules of origin. However, the administrative capacity of SADC customs authorities for the enforcement of the rules of origin is likely to be very weak. It is therefore unlikely that the rules of origin will be enforceable. If this observation is correct, then abstracting from internal transport costs, a SADC FTA will operate more or less as a CU in which the common external tariff is formed by the lowest tariff on each commodity in each of the member states of the proposed FTA. For simplicity this is called the CUmin. It is perhaps for this reason that just as the SADC FTA is about to be fully implemented, moves are being made for a move on to a SADC CU. Thus, there are really two FTA's. The 'intended' FTA is interpreted as if the rules of origin could be strictly enforced without cost. The 'actual' FTA with unenforceable rules of origin will be very much the same as the CUmin defined above. Internal transport costs will modify this outcome, but the CUmin considered here provides a useful counterfactual to consider. The CUmin would in fact have a low external tariff, an obvious advantage for minimising trade diversion. In the SADC context, FT without co-ordination or negotiation with trading partners is the logical outcome of a trade policy reform process under World Bank SAPs or under the WTO tariff reforms. It is therefore appropriate to develop an analytical framework within which the impact effects of each of the options discussed can be modelled. This facilitates the analysis of the effects of each form of regional integration on potential welfare gains and potential dynamic effects.
Methodology Used in this Study
The initial work on the impact of the SADC FTA for SADC (Evans (1997) ) relied on a partial equilibrium model and 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p671 weak data set. The data set was greatly improved in Evans (1998) , but the earlier partial equilibrium methodology was retained. The additional data requirements for the computable general equilibrium (CGE) version of the model, over and above the partial equilibrium version, were mainly on the demand side, and included the relevant input/output coefficients. Whilst the data were assembled using strong assumptions, the main structural differences between SADC countries were preserved. In particular, strong assumptions were applied to estimate country input/output coefficients, which were adjusted in terms of the South African coefficients using a modified RAS method. Thus, it was judged that the extended data set was adequate for a first general equilibrium exploration of SADC integration. Over all, the CGE model is based on 12 SADC countries and 37 productive sectors for each country. There were 9 agricultural sectors, a mining sector, one non-traded service sector, and 26 manufacturing and mining sectors. The production and trade data were for 1991-3 averages, and the tariff data were for the most recent year available at the time the model was built. The database used in partial equilibrium applications is described in Evans (1998) . Extensions for the general equilibrium application are available from the author. Some of the key assumptions and structural characteristics built into the general equilibrium model include:
Armington functions on the import side where the share of imports in total supply of a tradable good is inversely related to the price of imports relative to the price of domestic production. Similarly, imports from within the SADC region and from the ROW are treated as imperfectly substitutable and responsive to relative price 2000 SAJE v68(3) p672 changes. It is therefore possible to use the Armington functions to construct a composite import commodity made up of imports from within SADC and from the ROW, and for this composite import to be imperfectly substitutable with import competing production. The composite importable commodity enters into domestic demand in a straightforward manner.
(ii)
Perfectly elastic supply of goods in each sector. Where there is excess capacity, this is likely to be a good approximation. For agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors operating close to full capacity, the supply response is likely to be exaggerated.
Full employment of labour where labour inputs are measured in wage units. This is achieved by a macro expenditure adjustment to maintain full employment in terms of wage units at the initial constant wage. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption since it is likely that in SADC economies, although skilled labour may be fully employed, there is surplus unskilled labour and underemployment in the informal sector.*(6) (i)
A mark-up model of domestic cost formation. The mark-up is on wages and intermediate input costs. The model assumes fixed coefficients in respect of labour, as well as the more usual assumption of fixed proportions for intermediate inputs.
Balance of payments equilibrium is maintained via variation of the real exchange rate. based on an estimate of the change in consumer surplus net of estimated intermediate demand, less the loss of tariff revenue and the lump sum tax or subsidy required to maintain macro economic balance.
(v) An attempt was made to estimate SADC price elasticities of demand for exports to the ROW. This exercise was entirely unsatisfactory. Given the underlying weakness of the data, sensitivity tests were carried out.
(vi) Solution of the model was achieved with a Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure.
The Options in Detail
(a) The 'intended' FTA Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV, members of the GATT/WTO when forming a FTA are constrained in how the external tariffs are set. They must be set on a MFN basis and the external tariffs and other trade regulations shall not be higher than those existing prior to the FTA. The existing member country tariffs in respect of ROW countries remain as before, and the intra FTA tariffs are reduced to zero. The rules of origin are required to back up this arrangement, preventing individual economic agents from importing goods into the country with the lowest ROW tariff for that item and trans-shipping within the FTA without further tariff charges. This FTA is also referred to as the 'intended' FTA.
(b) CU: Specifying the Common External Tariff
For GATT/WTO members forming a CU under GATT Article XXIV, the external tariffs must also be set on a MFN 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p674 basis. Further, the common external tariff must not increase. One way of defining the common external tariff for a CU would be to choose for each commodity the highest tariff of the member countries, or CUmax. However, this method would fall foul of GATT Article XXIV whereby the common external tariff should not increase. A second method of forming the common external tariff would be to average the individual tariff items for the member countries, or CUavg. The CUavg would be less likely to fall foul of Article XXIV since there is some ambiguity in the definition of what an increased tariff is. Finally, the common external tariff could be formed by taking, for each traded item, the lowest of the member country tariffs and applying that as the common external tariff, or CUmin. The CUmin as defined above is unambiguously consistent with GATT Article XXIV. Compared with the CUmax and CUavg alternatives, the CUmin is more likely to produce an overall welfare gain, and in practice it always produces an estimated positive welfare change. The CUmin was therefore adopted for the CU experiments carried out.
(c)
The 'actual' FTA One of the characteristics of SADC already noted is that member states have a weak capacity to enforce the rules of origin. Importers will seek to route their imports through the country with the lowest relevant sectoral tariff with scant regard to the formal customs requirements. Thus, the proposed or 'intended' FTA could turn out to operate as if it had a common external tariff chosen on the basis, for each sector, of the lowest sectoral tariff amongst member countries. That is, abstracting from internal transport costs, the 'actual' FTA with unenforceable rules 2000 SAJE v68(3) p675 of origin will in fact operate as the CUmin defined above. This is to be compared with the 'intended' FTA as previously defined.
(d) FT: The Limiting Case of Open Regionalism (OR)
The hallmark of OR, compared with both the FTA and a CU, is that the negotiated tariff reductions for each country are all made on a MFN basis. Whilst it may appear that the MFN constraint takes away the incentive for member countries to negotiate tariff reduction, this is not necessarily the case. For example, the MFN constraint creates an incentive for member states to negotiate tariff reductions which maximise the growth of regional trade without 'passing on' benefits to third parties. Within OR, other areas of co-operation may be identified, for example foreign investment, technology or infrastructure. However, in all of these endeavours, OR is a co-operative arrangement rather that a rule-based community set up under GATT article XXIV as is the case with a FTA or a CU. It is also very different from the unilateral trade policy reform carried out in many SADC countries in the 1990s. Countries lowered tariffs towards FT under the auspices of World Bank SAPs, or under the auspices of the WTO. As a first exercise to explore the implications of the OR option, the simple extreme case is explored whereby all intra SADC and ROW tariffs are removed i.e. FT is applied.
Quantifying the Options (a) Comparative Static Welfare Effects
When there is net trade creation from freer regional trade, SADC countries will transfer resources from lower 2000 SAJE v68(3) p676 productivity to higher productivity activities. In the real SADC economies, there is unemployment, particularly surplus unskilled labour so the welfare benefits may be downward biased when calculations are based on full employment in wage units. The comparative static welfare changes for each of the options for 'large' and 'low' export elasticities are shown in Fig. 1 below: 
Figure 1. Regionalisation Options Compared.
It can be readily seen from Fig. 1 that the 'low' and 'large' export elasticities assumption does not alter greatly the welfare gain for the FTA 'intended' of a little over 0.10 per cent of initial Final Demand.*(7) For the CUmin and FT with large export elasticities, the comparative static gains increase greatly to nearly 0.50 per centand to over 0.60 per cent, respectively. However, with 'low' export elasticities, 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p677 the gains fall dramatically, particularly for FT, to very similar orders of magnitude to the 'intended' FTA. Thus, provided the export elasticities are large, the gains from trade would appear to be much larger for FT compared with the 'intended' FTA. It would therefore appear that the neo-classical presumptions on the regional gains from freer trade that inform both World Bank and WTO thinking are correct.
(b) Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
It is of some interest to explore the implications of the results for trade creation and trade diversion. There are a number of ways in which trade creation and trade diversion can be measured. A simple indirect measure is to see if either the 'intended' FTA or the CUmin produces regional welfare gains. The presence of regional welfare gains implies that regional trade creation dominates trade diversion. The regional welfare results shown in Fig. 1 suggest that trade creation dominates trade diversion, a finding also found in studies of other regional associations using CGE models (see Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999) . diversion is to compare aggregate intra trade flows under the 'intended' FTA and FT, or CUmin and FT. In Table 2 , the over-all changes in SADC and ROW trade are shown. It can be seen from Table 2 that the ranking of the expansion in SADC trade under the regional integration options considered is as expected. The Table 2 findings appear to confirm the view that a good deal of intra SADC trade expansion would take place anyway under FT. This phenomenon is often remarked upon in relation to the East Asian NICs, whose intra regional trade has expanded rapidly as well as the rapid expansion of their exports to the developed North. In SADC, the model shows a rise in intra trade only 1/3 greater under FTA than under FT. Thus, the aggregate data on estimated intra trade flow changes for SADC also appear to confirm the observation that trade creation dominates trade diversion. A closer examination of trade creation and trade diversion for SADC as a whole can be made using the 7-sector disaggregation of the changes in employment over the base levels shown in Table 3 : Notes: Large export elasticities; Units Employment '000'. Table 3 is aggregated from Appendix Table A2 .
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The results shown in Table 3 for the SADC FTA suggest that there is trade diversion in all sectors except Agriculture and Services. On the other hand, there was mainly trade creation under CUmin. This finding is confirmed by the regression analysis based on the full 37 sectors reported in Table 4 below. Table 4 , two regressions are reported in which the change in sectoral GDP under FT compared with the initial sectoral GDP is used as the independent variable and the change in GDP under the FTA and CUmin respectively are used as the dependent variables. In both cases, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the change in GDP under the FTA and the CUmin compared with that under FT, although the FTA regression is much weaker than for the CUmin. Thus, taking the sectoral GDP changes from base to FT as the indicator of SADC comparisons, the estimated FTA and the CUmin
change in GDP move towards FT. Similar results are obtained using the change in employment rather than the change in GDP as the indicator of sectoral change. The implication is that under the CUmin, most of the increased SADC trade is trade creating, whereas under the FTA, the net trade creation is much weaker.
(c)
Revenue Implications Recall the macro assumption used in the calculation of the impact effects of the options, whereby a macro expenditure adjustment was made to maintain full employment measured in wage units at the initial constant wage. Since government expenditure and investment were also held constant, this is equivalent to a lump-sum tax to offset any decline in tariff revenue. Whilst it is unrealistic to assume that any tariff revenue loss can be made up without efficiency loss, it is useful to examine the magnitude of the customs revenue losses and their share of estimated government expenditure, shown in Table 5 . The first point to note about Table 5 is the large variation in the percentage loss of tariff revenue and government revenue under the FTA and CUmin options; in the case of FT, by definition, all tariff revenue is lost. Second, the total impact on SADC government revenue of tariff losses is relatively small because of the small percentage effects in South Africa, which has a large GDP weight. However, several individual countries have government revenue losses of 10 per cent or more under the FTA. Government revenue losses are even higher under the CUmin and FT. When regional partners are poor and where alternative tax instruments such as income tax or value added tax are not well developed, the case for transitional arrangements to deal with the customs revenue 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p681 impact of regional integration on some member governments is strong. 
d) Dynamic Effects
In straightforward welfare terms, the analysis so far suggests that to aim for regional FT is the best option, tempered only by the transitional difficulties in some SADC member states in replacing lost customs revenue. The question therefore arises: are there excluded factors that may drive reasonable policy makers to adopt either the FTA or the CUmin in preference to FT? Consider the potential dynamic effects.*(8) These can be divided into:
Scale Economies and Productivity Effects. Within SADC, there are widespread opportunities for reaping scale economies outside traditional heavy industry, including the better use of infrastructure. When combined with productivity effects from trade creation and increased inducements for networking, this effect is likely to be very large. Typically, these effects are associated with increased intra trade.
Reinvestment of Initial Gains. SADC economies have traditionally had low rates of investment and low rates of utilisation of existing investment. If some of the excess capacity that exists in the region is taken up, and when a substantial part of the gains from freer trade are re-invested, faster growth can be expected. These gains are particularly likely to be realised when wider measures affecting the investment environment, such as greater certainty, are implemented. It is difficult to estimate the size of the dynamic gains without explicit modelling of these effects. Some of these effects are once-and-for-all, such as increased capacity utilisation. Others are fully dynamic such as the reinvestment effects. Here, the dynamic benefits are treated as once-and-for-all effects. Measurement is further complicated since the options considered have different implications for the size and composition of intra SADC trade, including different capital requirements for expansion of output. However, treating all dynamic effects as once and for all effects, very rough orders of magnitude of these effects range from four to six times the impact effects. Thus, taking the lower estimate of four times the impact effects, the total welfare effects could be of the orders of magnitude shown in Table 6 . The very approximate dynamic gains shown in Table 6 are assumed to operate in a multiplicative rather than 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p683 additive manner on the original welfare gains. They reflect a mix of impact effects, once-and-for-all dynamic changes, and dynamic benefits that continue into the future. But these should be treated with great caution. In particular, the CUmin and FT imply a very different sectoral mix of output so that the assumption of multiplicative dynamic benefits may not be a good one. It is not clear that the very approximate estimates of the dynamic benefits for the FTA would carry over to the CUmin or FT. Nevertheless, the estimates suggest that the potential benefits of regional integration in SADC are large indeed. Mandaza et al (1998) . Regional economic integration can add to the process of multilateral liberalisation when there is a commitment to a deeper form of integration going beyond the WTO framework. The idea of 'deep integration', recently developed by Lawrence (1996) , offers a simple but powerful insight into the relationship between pure trade liberalisation and policy co-ordination. Thus, the initial trade liberalisation alone under the FTA may bring small benefits. However, as already noted, the 'intended' FTA is unlikely to succeed because of unenforceable rules of origin. For credibility, the FTA needs to move on quickly to something like the CUmin. Without a progression from the FTA, there will be unenforceable rules of origin at the core of the regional co-operation arrangement. Once credibility 2000 SAJE v68(3) p684 has been restored with, for example CUmin, the benefits of specialisation, investment and growth effects will fully appear. A question therefore arises, would it be possible to go from a regional arrangement such as CUmin and realise the even greater welfare benefits under FT? Since deep integration is not implied by the FT option, the FT option may not be as attractive as it appears from the orders of magnitude of gains relative to CUmin shown in Table 4 . (e) Potential Terms of Trade Effects In addition to the exclusion of the benefits from deep integration in the FT option, the attractions of FT are tempered by potential terms of trade costs, noted by Kaplinsky (1998) for the East Asian case. Kaplinsky found that the newer East Asian NICs suffered terms of trade problems compared with the older NICs. This suggested that the older East Asian NICs were better able to offset any terms of trade problems in particular product lines by constantly upgrading products for niche marketing. In the SADC context, the effects on welfare of low export elasticities were much greater for FT than for CUmin. Put the other way around, CUmin with deep integration would be less likely to face adverse terms of trade effects than FT. It would also have a greater potential capacity to assist SADC exporters to constantly upgrade their products to counter adverse terms of trade pressures.
Concluding Remarks
Any assessment of conclusions based directly on the evidence from the SADC CGE model should be interpreted in the light of the preliminary nature of this CGE modelling exercise and any key data deficiencies that have an 2000 SAJE v68(3) p685 important bearing on policy choices. With all of the qualifications and cautionary remarks, the key conclusions from this paper are: (i) There are important regional welfare benefits, both static and dynamic, to be gained from the SADC FTA when implemented as intended. (ii) It is unlikely that the 'intended' FTA can be implemented because of unenforceable rules of origin. Thus, regional integration according to the 'actual' FTA will end up being like the CUmin. (iii) There is substantial trade diversion associated with the 'intended' FTA, although trade creation dominates. The CUmin has very little trade diversion. (iv)
Moving on to CUmin offers many advantages for SADC. The welfare gains would be dramatically increased, both static and dynamic. In particular, the opportunities for long run gains from a rule-based system with deep integration are likely to greatly increase. (v) Full FT appears to offer some advantages in terms of welfare gains compared with CUmin However, FT may miss the benefits of deep integration and it may not be as effective in providing firms with an enabling environment that may assist in offsetting potentially adverse terms of trade effects. (vi) There is scope for further research into the impact effects of the options for regional integration when the full employment assumption is dropped and more up to date data is used. Such modelling work will be greatly assisted from the first part of 2001 when the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data set for 1997 will be available for further CGE modeling of regional integration in Southern Africa. (vii) There is much scope for complementary work on sector case studies and on institutional aspects of regional 2000 SAJE v68 (3) p686 integration. Such work can only complement both case studies and political economy research on micro and institutional aspects of the path toward regional integration. 
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Appendix
